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Abstract
Observational studies of human health and disease (basic, clinical and epidemiological) are vulnerable to
methodological problems -such as selection bias and confounding- that make causal inferences problematic. Gene-
disease associations are no exception, as they are commonly investigated using observational designs. A rich body
of knowledge exists in medicine and epidemiology on the assessment of causal relationships involving personal
and environmental causes of disease; it includes seminal causal criteria developed by Austin Bradford Hill and more
recently applied directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). However, such knowledge has seldom been applied to assess
causal relationships in clinical genetics and genomics, even in studies aimed at making inferences relevant for
human health. Conversely, incorporating genetic causal knowledge into clinical and epidemiological causal
reasoning is still a largely unexplored area.
As the contribution of genetics to the understanding of disease aetiology becomes more important, causal
assessment of genetic and genomic evidence becomes fundamental. The method we develop in this paper
provides a simple and rigorous first step towards this goal. The present paper is an example of integrative research,
i.e., research that integrates knowledge, data, methods, techniques, and reasoning from multiple disciplines,
approaches and levels of analysis to generate knowledge that no discipline alone may achieve.
Introduction
Observational studies of human health and disease
(basic, clinical and epidemiological) are vulnerable to
methodological problems -such as selection bias and
confounding- that make causal inferences problematic.
Gene-disease associations are no exception, as they are
commonly investigated using observational designs.
However, as compared to studies of environmental
exposures, in genetic studies it is less likely that selec-
tion of subjects (e.g., cases and controls in a case-con-
trol study) is affected by genetic variants. Confounding
is also less likely, with the exception of linkage disequili-
brium (i.e., the attribution of a genetic effect to a speci-
fic gene rather than to an adjacent one) and population
stratification (when cases and controls are drawn from
different ethnic populations). There is in fact some
empirical evidence suggesting that gene-disease associa-
tions are less prone to confounding (e.g., by socio-eco-
nomic status) than associations between genes and
environmental and lifestyle variables [1]. There are some
well known methodological challenges in interpreting
the causal significance of gene-disease associations; they
include epistasis, linkage disequilibrium, and gene-envir-
onment interactions (GEI) [2].
A rich body of knowledge exists in medicine and epi-
demiology on assessment of causal relationships invol-
ving personal and environmental causes of disease; it
includes seminal causal criteria developed by Austin
Bradford Hill and more recently applied directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs). Perhaps unsurprisingly, such knowledge
has seldom been applied to assess causal relationships in
clinical genetics and genomics, even when studies aimed
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at making inferences relevant for human health. Conver-
sely, incorporating genetic causal knowledge into clinical
and epidemiological causal reasoning is still a largely
unexplored task.
In this paper, we first state our main aim; secondly, we
propose applications of Hill’s criteria to genetic pro-
blems and genetic epidemiology; thirdly, we use graphi-
cal methods to formulate and assess causal hypotheses
involving genes; finally, we use a case study of Parkin-
son’s disease to apply the combined Hill / DAGs
approach to untangling the underlying GEIs.
Aim of the paper
The main aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual
framework to assess causal relationships in clinical
genomics and, particularly, for evaluating the etiopatho-
genic significance of gene-disease associations and gene-
environment interactions; i.e., a framework to assess the
validity and significance of such environment-host-gene
relationships in the etiology of human diseases. The fra-
mework includes a two-step approach that combines the
causal criteria of Austin Bradford Hill with graphical
models such as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). The
approach we propose thus helps, first, to untangle the
web of interactions amongst several exposures and char-
acteristics (environmental, clinical and genetic) and a
disease. Once these relationships have been specified,
they are analyzed using criteria to assess causality that
have long been used in clinical and epidemiological
research. More generally, the present paper is an exam-
ple of integrative research, i.e., research that integrates
knowledge, data, methods, techniques, and reasoning
from multiple disciplines, approaches and levels of ana-
lysis to generate knowledge that no discipline alone may
achieve [3].
Applying causal guidelines to genetic studies
For several decades, guidelines to assess causality have
been a powerful tool in clinical and epidemiological
research, as well as in the professional practice of medi-
cine and epidemiology outside academia [4-7]. Causal
guidelines usually include a series of criteria that help
assess which observed associations are potentially causal.
They were introduced initially by Bradford-Hill in the
debate about the role of smoking in the aetiology of
lung cancer; given the issue, they were meant for obser-
vational studies only, but many of the criteria can be
applied to clinical trials and other experimental studies
as well [8]. Although Hill did not have genetic epide-
miology in mind at the time, today his criteria remain
relevant to causal assessment in this field and, as we will
show, to many areas of human genetics as well.
Hill’s approach is based on nine criteria: 1) Strength of
association; 2) Consistency; 3) Specificity of association;
4) Temporality; 5) Biological gradient (dose-response
relationship); 6) Biological plausibility; 7) Coherence; 8)
Experimental evidence (e.g. reproducibility in animal
models); and 9) Analogy. Statistical significance was not
listed but discussed separately by Hill [8].
One major criticism leveled at Hill’s approach is that
it considers one causal factor at a time and is not
intended to tackle complex relationships and interac-
tions, such as those encountered in modern molecular
medicine and genomics, which deal with chains of med-
iators and not only directly acting exposures. However,
even complex situations can often be decomposed into
simpler constituents, and in such case Hill’s criteria can
be applied fruitfully. This is a main motivation behind
the present work.
In 2006, a Human Genome Epidemiology Network
(HuGENet) workshop in Venice was devoted to the
development of standardized criteria for the assessment
of the credibility of cumulative evidence on gene-disease
associations. This led to synopses on various topics in
genetic epidemiology; e.g., on DNA repair [9], and on
Parkinson’s disease [10]. Briefly, according to the Venice
guidelines [2] each gene-disease association is graded on
the basis of the amount of evidence, replication, and
protection from bias. These guidelines contributed to
modifying the approach to genetic inferences using
Hill’s criteria that we adopt here.
Main theoretical issues underlying the application of
Hill’s criteria in genetics and genomics are shown in
Appendix 1 [11-29]; below we will show how these cri-
teria can be applied to an example of gene-environment
interaction. Interactions here are defined as “the interde-
pendent operation of two or more causes to produce,
prevent, or control an effect” [2].
In summary, Hill’s causal criteria and related logical
tools that have long been applied fruitfully to clinical
and epidemiological research may also be applied pro-
ductively to research in genetics. However, genetic
research has fundamental differences from clinical and
epidemiological research. For example, in genetics con-
founding can be the consequence of events that may
not be directly addressed at the other levels, including
haplotype blocks, allelic heterogeneity, overdominance,
and epistasis [15]. Selection bias is more easily measur-
able in genomic studies, because we have the null
hypothesis represented by Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
(HWE); i.e., we expect independent assortment of alleles
in the population, whereas a similar reasoning cannot be
applied to daily life exposures. Hardy-Weinberg equili-
brium is based on assumptions of population genetics
related to the lack of selection, inbreeding, migration;
departure from HWE can thus point towards the possi-
bility of gross bias (such as genotyping errors or selec-
tion bias).
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Explicit guidelines for causal assessment are more
popular in clinical and epidemiological research than in
genetics [3,30]. The reasons for that have seldom been
addressed. They are probably related to the different
nature of the objects, factors, mechanisms and processes
that we study at each level. However, genetic guidelines
on causality do exist and, in fact, have interesting simila-
rities with Hill’s criteria: (a) linkage to a particular
region of the human genome (LOD>3); (b) one or more
independent mutations that are concordant with disease
status in affected families (specificity, strength of asso-
ciation); (c) defects that lead to macrochanges in the
protein (specificity, coherence); (d) putative mutations
that are not present in a sample from a control popula-
tion (specificity); or (e) presence of some other line of
biological evidence (including expression, knockout data,
etc.) [15]. Criteria (a), (b) and (c) refer to background
knowledge. But it is in particular criterion (e) that sup-
ports the causal association by conferring coherence
with previous knowledge [3,15].
Directed acyclic graphs as tools to clarify
associations and complex causal relationships
Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have a long tradition in
science. They are a rigorous way of visualising complex
systems, clarifying ideas, complementing the formulation
of hypotheses, and guiding quantitative analyses. There
has been much debate on the exact nature and roles of
DAGs in the biomedical literature. The most widespread
approach in the health sciences is the causal DAG
approach promoted by Greenland, Robins, Hernán and
colleagues [31-33], and the equivalent mathematical fra-
mework of counterfactuals [34]. In causal DAG
approaches, the directed edges in a DAG represent cau-
sal relationships. Whilst the causal DAG framework is
appealing and intuitive, we wish to draw attention to an
alternative approach to causal inference, the Decision
Theoretic Framework (DTF), which is based on a for-
mal treatment of conditional independences (a non-
graphical version of the ‘d-separation criteria’) [35].
Appendix 2 provides additional details on statistics and
assumptions underlying the DTF [36-38]. This
approach has recently become increasingly popular in
epidemiology, in particular to assess the role of genes
as instrumental variables for causal inference [39]. DTF
retains the advantages of the causal DAG approach but
overcomes some of its limitations. In particular, as
DTF uses DAGs to describe the relationships between
variables, it retains the capacity of DAGs to clearly and
formally visualise complex systems. In contrast to the
causal DAG approach where all directed edges are
assumed to represent causal relationships, DTF takes a
more conservative view where the edges represent sta-
tistical associations (and the lack of edges represents
independence). Causality in DTF is viewed as external
knowledge that can be added to the DAGs and allows
some of the edges to be interpreted as causal. There
are three reasons for this conservative viewpoint. The
first is that it entails fewer assumptions about the exis-
tence and direction of causal relationships between
variables. The second is that it is not necessary to
include all possible causes or covariates in a DAG, only
the variables of interest, making DTF more flexible
than the causal DAG approach. The third is that when
we perform a statistical analysis of observational data,
we obtain measures of association (not causation)
between variables. We explain this concept in more
detail below.
A main problem when making causal inferences in
clinical and epidemiological research is that most data
are observational. This is also true for a substantial part
of basic biomedical research. It is certainly an issue in
human genetics, where there is usually no randomiza-
tion (except in circumstances where Mendelian rando-
mization can be applied [1,3,39,40]), and knowledge of
the genetic pathways is tenuous or incomplete. In such
circumstances we must be careful to distinguish causal
relationships from associations resulting from unob-
served biases or chance.
DAGs can still be used to make causal inference, but
the causal element is an external assumption that needs
to be explicitly incorporated into the DAG rather than
implicit in the direction of an edge. We use a DAG to
visualise complex associations, but when we only have
observational data at our disposal, we must find other
ways to assess a) whether a particular association is cau-
sal and not due to confounding or other bias, and b)
what the direction of this association is.
The problem of inferring causality from observational
data in the presence of unobserved confounding is sim-
ply described in the DAGs in Figure 1.
In the DAG on the left hand side X is the putative
cause -e.g., a particular environmental exposure such as
urban pollution-, Y is the disease outcome under inves-
tigation, and U a set of confounders, many of which will
typically be unobserved. Epidemiologists are interested
in the existence, direction and strength of the X-Y asso-
ciation and whether this can be considered causal.
(They are not necessarily interested in whether the
other relationships in the DAG are causal). However,
they are often unable to capture all this information
from observational studies due to the presence of unob-
served confounders U. Even when there is no direct
association -i.e., there is no edge between X and Y as in
the DAG on the right hand side of the Figure 1-, the
presence of U (this time as a common parent) will result
in a statistical association between the two. Again, the
question is, how do we distinguish a causal association
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from a statistical association when only observational
data are available?
One way to answer this question is by incorporating
prior knowledge in Hill’s scheme (or similar criteria)
with DAGs to determine which edges can be considered
causal. This is the approach we propose in this paper
and that we describe in detail below. Another way of
introducing causality is by adding so called intervention
or randomisation variables to a DAG and to the corre-
sponding probability statements. A more detailed
description of such variables is given in Appendix 2. As
a thorough explanation is beyond the scope of this
paper we refer the interested reader to Dawid [41],
Didelez [42], Geneletti [43], and Lauritzen [44].
For the remainder of this paper, the DAGs we use can
be viewed as heuristic tools to understand gene-environ-
ment relationships.
Parkinson’s disease: pesticides, and gene-
environment interactions
In order to illustrate our methods, we present a case
study based on Parkinson’s disease. First we present a
short description of the disease and a summary litera-
ture review of its genetic component; we focus in parti-
cular on a recently identified genetic form. Second, we
use graphical methods to propose and assess hypotheses
on how the risk factors might interact. Third, we apply
Hill’s criteria to each of the hypothesised associations to
assess causality in light of the available evidence.
Parkinson’s disease is the most common neurodegen-
erative disorder after Alzheimer’s disease, affecting 16-
19 new individuals per 100,000 persons each year in
developed countries [45]. Characterized by bradykinesia,
resting tremor, rigidity and postural instability, it is also
one of the most common late-life movement disorders.
The pathological characteristic of the disease is a selec-
tive loss of pigmented neurons, most prominently in the
substantia nigra (one of the brain basal ganglia) accom-
panied by a characteristic a-synuclein-positive inclusion
Figure 1 DAG demonstrating the ideas of confounding. A: U is
an unobserved confounder for the association between X and Y
and X is a cause of Y. B: U is an unobserved confounder for the
association between X and Y but X is not a cause of Y. From purely
observational data these two situations cannot be separated.
Figure 2 Three DAGs exhibiting the same conditional
independence but with different causal interpretations.
Figure 3 DAG with a randomisation node R. R indicates
whether X is randomised or allowed to arise naturally. A: U is a
confounder. B: U is a mediator. Randomisation allows us to
distinguish between these situations.
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bodies in neurons (Lewy bodies) [45]. While the causes
of Parkinson’s disease remain unknown, significant pro-
gress is being made in elucidating genetic and environ-
mental risk factors and the neurodegenerative process
underlying the disease. Appendix 3 summaries the key
evidences to date on environmental and genetic risk fac-
tors for Parkinson’s disease [46-49].
A deletion of the DJ-1 gene in a Dutch family and a
mutation conferring a functionally inactive form in an
Italian family associated with early onset PD were first
observed in 2001 [50], and confirmed in 2003 [51] (as is
convention, we use italics to indicate the gene and non-
italics to indicate the protein; thus, DJ-1 means the
gene, and DJ-1 means the protein). DJ-1 is involved in
many cell processes including oncogenic transformation,
gene expression and chaperon activity, and it mediates
oxidative stress responses [52]. A recent meta-analysis
of the association between pesticides and Parkinson’s
disease [53] concludes that the epidemiologic evidence
suggests a fairly consistent association between exposure
to pesticides and risk of developing Parkinson’s disease.
In particular, among the herbicides, paraquat has been
found to be most strongly associated with the risk of
the disease (with odds ratios ranging from 1.25 to 3.22).
Toxicological evidence suggests that both paraquat and
rotenone exert a neurotoxic action that might play a
role in the etiopathogenic process of Parkinson’s disease.
Moreover, clinical symptoms of Parkinson’s disease have
been reproduced in rats by chronic administration of
paraquat [54]. Evidence from animal experiments shows
that knockout models of Drosophila Melanogaster (fruit
fly) lacking DJ-1 function, display a marked and selective
sensitivity to the environmental oxidative insults exerted
by both paraquat and rotenone [54]; this suggests that
there is an interaction between these toxicants and the
DJ-1 genotype [3]. On the basis of these data, it is sensi-
ble to hypothesise an interaction between DJ-1, exposure
to some pesticides, and risk of Parkinson’s disease in
humans as well. Using Hill’s criteria we can say that the
hypothesis has biological plausibility; also, testing the
hypothesis entails testing Hill’s criterion of analogy (i.e.,
testing that there are analogous causal mechanisms in
certain animal models and in humans). To test the
hypothesis, further investigation is needed in order to
estimate the effect of the interaction between DJ-1 and
exposure to specific pesticides in humans on the risk of
developing Parkinson’s disease. We can construct a logic
framework displaying (a) the association of paraquat (P)
with Parkinson’s disease (Y); (b) the association of DJ-1
with Parkinson’s diseases; and (c) the interaction of DJ-1
with exposure to paraquat. We can also assume the
existence of confounding between the exposure to para-
quat and the disease outcome (Cp), and between DJ-1
and disease outcome (Cd) (Figure 4). First we are going
to propose a graphical method to untangle the relation-
ship between these two risk factors and Parkinson’s dis-
ease; in a second step we will evaluate the associations
from a more strictly causal point of view.
Case study: the DJ-1 gene, exposure to paraquat
and risk of Parkinson’s disease
The process we describe in this section has two compo-
nents. The first uses DAGs as a visual tool to explore a
range of possible interaction scenarios. The second uses
DAGs as a formal tool to describe the formal depen-
dence among the variables in the problem. These two
components go hand in hand, as intuition about the
problem will generally guide the first whilst the second
will reflect information in the observed data as well as
considerations about what is biologically plausible. In a
second instance, which is beyond the scope of this
paper, the interaction quantitative effects can be esti-
mated. How the latter step is done will depend both on
the nature of the data available and crucially on the
model for interaction. We assume an additive interac-
tion model for simplicity; however, the DAGs work
equally well with a multiplicative model as they describe
associations rather than their exact mathematical nature.
We consider first the case study of gene-environment
interactions (GEI) involving risk of Parkinson’s disease,
Figure 4 DAG showing all possible one way relationships for
gene-environment interactions based on the observed
variables.
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the DJ-1 gene and exposure to paraquat described
above. To do this we use simplified versions of models
proposed by Khoury et al. [55] and Ottman [56]. Subse-
quently, we consider fruit fly experiments where the
associations between Parkinson’s, DJ-1 and paraquat
have been ascertained, and we present this as the ideal
situation to make causal inference. The approach we are
proposing can be also used to tackle a range of other
complex problems.
In order to look at possible GEI scenarios we need to
introduce some simple notation:
gene: DJ-1 = d* variant (deletion as in the Dutch
families or inactivity as in the Italian families); DJ-1 = d
wild type
pesticides: P = p* exposed; P = p unexposed
disease: Y = 1 with Parkinson’s disease; Y = 0 without
Parkinson’s disease
The crux of this approach is the introduction of an
interaction variable I. It is determined by the values of
the genetic and environmental exposure variables. In
simple terms, it acts like a switch and is turned “on”
when the parents (a parent P of another variable X has
an edge pointing into X, and X is a child of P) take on
some values, and “off” when the parents have other
values. In the current context this is typically the pre-
sence of the genetic exposure (i.e., the genetic variant)
and/or the environmental exposure that leads to an
increase in disease risk which turns the interaction “on”.
Thus, in addition to the above variables, we also define:
interaction: I = 1 ("on”) if there is an interaction and I
= 0 ("off”) if there isn’t. The exact nature of the interac-
tion depends on the contexts sketched below.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that I is a
deterministic variable. What we mean by this is that
unlike the other variables in the problem, I is not ran-
dom. Once the value of its parents is known, then so is
the value of I. This might be considered unduly restric-
tive if there are other potential parents in the interac-
tion which are suspected but unobserved. It is possible
in these cases to view I as a random variable, where its
variability is associated with that of the unobserved
interactant. However, in the paper we focus on
the simplest case and thus we make the following
assumption:
1. DJ-1 and P are the only parents of the interaction
variable I. Another assumption that is generally
plausible, provided that the exposure does not mod-
ify the genetic structure (e.g., the exposure does not
cause somatic mutations) is that:
2. There is no a priori association between the gene
and the external exposure; this is represented by the
absence of a directed edge between DJ-1 and P in
the DAGs below.
Generally, this is a plausible assumption provided that
the exposure does not modify the genetic structure [57].
In this specific example, this assumption is likely to be
true. However, with other environmental exposures this
assumption does not hold. For example, the association
of some lifestyle factors with genotypes predisposing (or
causing) Parkinson’s disease is possible as the dopami-
nergic system is involved in rewarding mechanisms and
it is hypothesized to influence some seeking behaviours
and addiction (i.e., smoking or alcohol drinking) [58].
The idea of I as a variable to represent interaction is
similar to the sufficient component cause (SCC) vari-
ables in VanderWeele and Robins [59]. We feel however
that our approach presents a few advantages over the
SCC framework. As we do not need to incorporate all
the sufficient causes (we are not using a causal DAG),
the structure of our DAGs is less cumbersome. Also,
although for the sake of simplicity we have defined I in
terms of binary exposures, we can easily extend it if we
are considering multi-valued or continuous exposures.
The DAG in Figure 4 shows a complex situation we can
imagine, given assumptions 1 and 2, in which there is
confounding between both the exposure to paraquat
and the disease outcome (Cp) as well as confounding
between DJ-1 and the disease (Cd), and no other vari-
ables are postulated. Confounding between both expo-
sure to paraquat and the disease might be due, for
example, to the fact that people exposed to paraquat
may also be more likely to smoke, a factor that is nega-
tively associated with the risk of Parkinson’s disease
[60]. Confounding between DJ-1 and the disease might
be due to the involvement of the dopamine-mediated
rewarding system [58]. Any observational study -any
study of these issues in humans- is unlikely to observe
all potential confounders. Nevertheless, just to simplify
our model, we also assume that:
3. There are no further confounders between either
the gene and the outcome or the exposure and the
outcome. This is represented by the absence of addi-
tional variables and corresponding directed edges in
the DAGs below.
Now we turn our attention to looking at the case by
evaluating the plausibility of a few different GEI scenar-
ios. As mentioned above, these are loosely based on
Khoury et al. [55]. For each of the models that we con-
sider below, we present a more formal description in
Appendix 4.
Model I
Both exposure and genotype are required to increase
risk as in Figure 5. Here, if I is “on” then there is an
association between the disease and the genetic
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exposure and the environmental exposure to pesticides
when both are present. If on the other hand I is “off”
then there is no association -in other words, Parkin-
son’s is only associated with DJ-1 and paraquat expo-
sure through the interaction itself. This is an extreme
form of interaction that is unlikely to occur in the
pathogenesis of common diseases. Does this model
describe the relationship between DJ-1, exposure to
pesticides and Parkinson’s disease? For this to be the
case, all the Dutch and Italian families with the variant
DJ-1 and Parkinson’s would also have to have been
exposed to pesticides. Further, the incidence of Parkin-
son’s amongst the families with the gene variant would
have to be the same on average as that of those with-
out the gene variant (if unexposed to pesticides). Simi-
larly, those exposed to pesticides would have to have
the same incidence as those not exposed to the pesti-
cides without the DJ-1 variant. This is clearly not the
case.
Model II
The exposure to pesticides increases the risk of disease
but the presence of the gene variant alone does not
increase the risk of disease, although the variant further
increases the risk of disease in the exposed population
(Figure 6). In this model, I is switched on and off by P.
When P = p* (exposure to pesticides) I = 1, indicating
that the interaction is switched “on” and the presence of
the variant in DJ-1 and Parkinson’s is influential. When
P = p then I = 0 and whether DJ-1 is the variant or
wild-type form makes no difference to the outcome Y.
It is possible that in some cases exposure to P is protec-
tive; i.e., I would take the opposite value of P in a binary
situation. In more complex situations, the effect of P
might be such that only certain values of P result in
interactions and in these cases the values of I and P
would not be the same. In this instance, we have that Y
depends directly on exposure P; however, Y depends on
DJ-1 only through the interaction and the exposure
when this is present -i.e. when P = p*.
This model is also not a plausible description of the
relationship between the three variables based on the
evidence at hand, as it would mean that all the families
with the variant and Parkinson’s would have to also
have been exposed to pesticides.
Model III
Exposure to pesticides exacerbates the effect of the gene
variant but has no effect on persons with the normal
genotype. In this model, I is switched on and off by DJ-
1. The model does not provide either a plausible expla-
nation of the available evidence (Figure 7).
Figure 5 Both DJ-1 gene and pesticide exposure need to be
present to activate the interaction.
Figure 6 Pesticide has an effect but DJ-1 only has an effect if
pesticide exposure is present.
Figure 7 DJ-1 has an effect but pesticide only has an effect if
the gene mutation is present.
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Model IV
The environmental exposure and the gene variant both
have some effect of their own but together they further
modify the effect of the other. Here I is a function of
both P and DJ-1 and is defined as follows: I is “on” if
and only if both P and DJ-1 are “on” otherwise I is “off”.
Here there are also direct associations between P and Y
and DJ-1 and Y other than through I; this indicates that
there are effects of P on Y irrespective of DJ-1, and
effects of DJ-1 on Y irrespective of P. From the data we
cannot distinguish between DAGs A and B in Figure 8.
A core issue with these models is that I is essentially
unobservable in humans living under normal conditions;
these biological interactions can only be tested in animal
experiments. Thus, in humans we cannot disentangle
the two DAGs above apart without further information
(VanderWeele and Robins [61] provide some tests to
determine which individuals present Y only when the
interaction I is “on” provided there is no unmeasured
confounding). In order to be able to fully tell them
apart, an experiment can be conducted or the relative
risks can be compared (see Appendix 1).
In light of the evidence on Parkinson’s disease, we
have to favour one of the two models IV above the
other three, as it would appear that both the genetic
and the environmental exposure have separate (indepen-
dent) effects on the risk of Parkinson’s. However, from
the data on humans we cannot distinguish between the
two “type IV” models until we run a study to determine
the presence of an interaction. In the case of the Droso-
phila experiments (see section below) the interaction
model on the left-hand side provides a better explana-
tion, as flies with the mutation that have been exposed
demonstrate further sensitivity to exposure to pesticides
than those who do not have the mutation.
The example we have shown exemplifies, we think, a
common situation concerning the interaction between
metabolic genes and environmental exposures (e.g. ary-
lamines and NAT2, PAH and GSTM1 and many others)
but has the peculiarity that experiments in Drosophila
have been done (see below).
Experimental evidence: the case of the Drosophila
The DAGs above alone cannot be directly used for cau-
sal inference unless additional assumptions are made or
experiments conducted. The reason is the limited infor-
mation on potential confounders (and intermediate vari-
ables, etc.) that can influence the relationship between
the three observed variables. For the sake of making the
DAGs clear, we have assumed that there are no con-
founders; however this is unlikely to be the case in prac-
tice as Parkinson’s is a multifactorial disease. The
method we have proposed can however be extended to
include confounders and intermediate variables.
In the case of Drosophila the situation is simpler.
Meulener et al. [49] show that both exposure to pesti-
cides and the mutation of DJ-1 may be associated with
increased risk of neural degeneration. Further, the com-
bination of the two has also been demonstrated to
aggravate the condition, as the flies which had the DJ-1
gene knocked out exhibited a ten-fold increase in sensi-
tivity to paraquat (which would indicate a supra-multi-
plicative interaction).
As in this case both the genetic make-up and the
exposure status of the flies have been intervened upon
under controlled conditions, we can make causal infer-
ence based on this data by introducing randomisation
variables into our DAG. The DAG in Figure 9 is an aug-
mented DAG [38] that includes randomisation variables
Rp and Rd. These tell us whether P or DJ-1 are being
randomised or not and allow us to make inferences
about interventions and, hence, causality using DAGs.
For a more detailed discussion see Appendix 2.
The DAG in Figure 9 implied that for the Drosophila
at least we can state that exposure to pesticides causes
an increased risk of neural damage, as does the presence
of the mutated DJ-1 gene. Also as the combined pre-
sence of the mutation and paraquat further increases
the risk of neural damage, we can ascertain the presence
of an interaction. It should be noted that DAGs do not
specify or constrain the model of statistical interaction,
Figure 8 Both DJ-1 and the pesticide have an effect and there
is a possible interaction in A but not in.
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which can follow either an additive or a multiplicative
null hypothesis model.
In the case of humans, we cannot assume such rando-
misation variables exist (except in Mendelian randomi-
sation which, however, applies to gene variants only,
and not to exposure); thus, we cannot expand the DAG
in Figure 6. On the other hand, etiologic factors and
clinical phenotypes are usually more diverse in human
diseases than in animal models; inferences to human
diseases from relatively simple animal experiments have
well known limitations. An avenue for progress lies in
integrating DAGs with the inductive reasoning implicit
in Hill’s guidelines.
Application of causal guidelines to DJ-1 and exposure to
paraquat for Parkinson’s disease
Following the DAG approach, we established the rela-
tionship between genes and some environment expo-
sures in promoting Parkinson’s disease, and we
proposed different interaction models between DJ-1,
pesticides and Parkinson’s disease. In order to apply
Hill’s causal guidelines to the DAGs we are going to
work with (Figure 6A), we need to label each of the
edges. Throughout the rest of this section we use the
following labels:
• The edge between DJ-1 and Parkinson’s disease is
referred to as [edge 1],
• The edge between exposure to pesticides and Par-
kinson’s disease is referred to as [edge 2],
• The interaction between DJ-1 and the exposure to
pesticides in causing Parkinson’s disease is called
[edge 3].
Hill’s guidelines are discussed in a slightly different
order than in the original version and statistical signifi-
cance is omitted because it refers to the contingent
evaluation of each study and does not require a specific
discussion in relation to genomics.
(a) Strength of association. DJ-1 has been seen to
be lacking in Dutch families with Parkinson’s dis-
ease, and to be functionally inactive because of a
point mutation in the Italian families studied by
Bonifati and cols [51]. The deletion showed com-
plete cosegregation with the disease allele in the
Dutch family [51]; also in the Italian family the
homozygous mutation showed complete cosegrega-
tion with the disease haplotype, and absence from
large numbers of control chromosomes [62].
Although the function of the DJ-1 protein is
unknown, these data suggest a strong association
between the DJ-1 gene and the occurrence of Par-
kinson’s disease in certain families [edge 1]. To
establish the strength of the association between spe-
cific environmental factors and a disease is far more
complicated, mainly due to the quality of exposure
assessment, the latency period, and body concentra-
tions during the lifecourse. A meta-analysis of the
association of pesticides and Parkinson’s disease
points out that both pesticide exposure in general
and selective exposure to paraquat seem to be asso-
ciated with Parkinson’s disease, with odds ratios ran-
ging from 1.25 (95% C.I.: 0.34 - 4.36) to 3.22 (95%
C.I.: 2.41 to 4.31) [53] [edge 2]. With respect to the
interaction parameter, there is as yet no epidemiolo-
gical study that has tested whether there is an inter-
action between DJ-1 and pesticides; thus neither the
existence nor the strength of such an association are
known. However, knockout models of Drosophila
Melanogaster (fruit fly) lacking DJ-1 function, display
a marked and selective sensitivity to the environ-
mental oxidative insults exerted by both paraquat
and rotenone [49], suggesting an interaction between
these toxicants and the DJ-1 genotype [edge 3] in
animal models and, consequently, that in humans
the interaction between the chemicals and DJ-1 is
biologically plausible (as can be seen, Hill’s criteria
often “interact”, i.e., they are often related to each
other, as in this paragraph the strength of associa-
tion is related to the biological plausibility).
(b) Consistency of the association. After the first
variants described, different variants of the DJ-1
gene associated with the same Parkinson’s disease
phenotype have been found in patients of Ashkenazi
Jewish and Afro-Caribbean origins [63,64] [edge 1].
The association of paraquat and rotenone with Par-
kinson’s disease is more consistent in animals (in
which these two toxicants are often used to produce
animal models of the disease) [54] than in humans.
In environmental epidemiological studies in humans,
Figure 9 DAG representing the fruit-fly experiment where
interventions were performed both on the genetic make-up
and the pesticide exposure. The interaction can therefore be
identified.
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the association has been found substantially consis-
tent across studies, although some associations did
not reach statistical significance, mainly due to lim-
ited sample size. In a study in Taiwan, where para-
quat is routinely used in rice fields, a strong
association between paraquat exposure and Parkin-
son’s disease was found; the hazard increased by
more than six times in subjects exposed for more
than 20 years [64]. A dose-response curve with
length of exposure was also observed in plantation
workers in Hawaii [65], and British Columbia [66].
In a population-based case-control study in Calgary,
occupational herbicide use was the only significant
predictor of Parkinson’s disease in multivariable ana-
lysis [67]. However, in another population-based
case-control study in Washington, the odds ratio of
1.67 did not reach statistical significance (95% CI:
0.22-12.76) [68] [edge 2]. There is yet no evidence
from human studies to confirm the consistency of
GEIs in the causation of Parkinson’s disease [edge
3]. Furthermore, genes other than DJ-1 may be
involved in the etiopathogenic process, and so may
be exposures other than pesticides, and other GEIs.
Since environmental conditions vary substantially
across the globe, and the role of one gene, one expo-
sure or one GEI is often dependent on other genes,
exposures and GEIs, lack of consistency is to be
expected in studies conducted in different settings,
and in particular when studies focus only on a few
GEIs and overlook other interactions.
(c) Specificity of the association. The specificity of
the association between DJ-1 gene mutations and
Parkinson’s disease [edge 1] will be clearer once the
data on the pathological features of the DJ-1 patients
will be available (see Appendix 3). Chronic systemic
exposure to rotenone has been demonstrated to
cause highly selective nigrostriatal dopaminergic
degeneration associated with characteristic move-
ment disorders in rats [54] [edge 2]. Similarly, para-
quat caused a significant loss of nigral dopaminergic
neurons in mice compared to controls [69] [edge 2].
Once an appropriate epidemiological study is set up
aimed at studying GEIs in this context, results from
the pathological analysis of the sample subjects will
help to answer important questions regarding the
aetiological pathway of the disease [edge 3].
(d) Temporality. This criterion does not apply
directly to genotype, as it is determined at concep-
tion and it remains constant over time (see Appen-
dix 1) [edge 1]. However, temporality is crucial if we
go beyond genetic effects and consider epigenetic
mechanisms; e.g., gene regulation by environmental
factors [14,16-18]. This problem goes beyond the
present contribution, but is worth mentioning.
Concerning pesticides, temporality might be a con-
cern given that all studies on GEI in Parkinson’s dis-
ease are case-control studies, which are particularly
prone to selection bias, disease progression bias, and
so-called “reverse causality” [3,70,71]. In this case,
while it is unlikely that suffering from Parkinson’s
disease would have influenced past exposure to pes-
ticides or their metabolism, it could have influenced
recall. The observed dose-response relationship, with
20 years of exposure required [53], favours the exis-
tence of a true association, and is compatible with
disease characteristics of neurodegeneration, making
the temporality pattern suggestive of a causal role
[edge 2].
(e) Biological gradient. This criterion does not
apply since we are dealing with a recessive model of
inheritance. Nonetheless, a co-dominant model
should not be completely ruled out as a careful neu-
rological evaluation of heterozygote subjects might
point out some sub-clinical changes [edge 1]. A
dose-response relationship between toxicant expo-
sure and neural loss in animal experiments has been
observed [72]. In addition, several studies observed a
positive correlation with duration of exposure to,
and high dose of, herbicides and insecticides in
humans [53] [edge 2].
(f) Biological plausibility. Biological plausibility of
the DJ-1 mutation awaits the discovery and charac-
terisation of the encoded protein [edge 1]; the cap-
ability of some toxicants to induce a progressive
cellular loss in the substantia nigra and to be
responsible for a progressive clinical syndrome with
an intervening latent period has been hypothesized
[54] [edge 2]. It is, therefore, plausible that these two
factors may interact during the course of life produ-
cing Parkinson’s symptoms in genetically susceptible
individuals [edge 3].
(g) Coherence with previous knowledge. Confirma-
tion of the presence of different mutations on the
same DJ-1 gene in families with other background
origins but manifesting the same symptoms supports
the involvement of the gene in the disease [63,64]
[edge 1]. A role of herbicides in neurodegeneration
has also been studied with generally confirmatory
results [edge 2].
All these considerations taken together suggest that
there may be a potential interaction between exposure
to certain pesticides and the DJ-1 mutation in the risk
of developing Parkinson’s disease. However, as no stu-
dies on humans have yet been specifically conducted to
investigate this issue, we can use the evidence only as a
reason to further explore this interaction, perhaps by
conducting a more targeted study. As mentioned, it is
Geneletti et al. Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2011, 8:5
http://www.ete-online.com/content/8/1/5
Page 10 of 18
likely that other factors (both genetic and environmen-
tal) also contribute to the final development of the
disease.
In the example above we have shown that the DAG
approach can be complemented by the use of Hill’s
guidelines when no experimental evidence can be
brought to bear on a particular gene-environment
interaction.
Conclusions
While medical and epidemiologic evidence is routinely
assessed to determine the causal nature of relationships
involving personal and environmental causes of disease,
genetic associations have so far not undergone similar
scrutiny. However, like epidemiologic studies, genetic
studies are also commonly based on observational stu-
dies, and may thus be affected by similar weaknesses. As
the contribution of genetics to the understanding of dis-
ease etiology becomes more important, causal assess-
ment of genetic and genomic evidence will become a
key issue [73].
We have explored two complementary ways to tackle
causality in gene-environment interactions. The applica-
tion of causal guidelines to genetics is not straightfor-
ward, and it becomes very complex, in particular, if one
wants to study gene-environment interactions, as we
have illustrated with Parkinson’s disease. Hill’s criteria
were developed to examine one factor at a time and
have seldom been applied to evaluate the causal nature
of complex relationships involving several exposures. On
the other hand, graphical approaches like DAGs are
effective in making potential causal networks explicit,
but are insufficient to establish the strength of evidence
(e.g., edges cannot be interpreted as causal without
some kind of additional external support). This seems to
be a general problem of causal networks, not only gene-
environment interactions.
The graphical approach is useful in particular for
clarifying complex causal pathways. We have applied it
to a simple example where the inner workings (i.e., the
detailed biological mechanisms in animal models) of
the interaction are not completely known. The
approach we propose uses the statistically formal
representation of DAG models. This is in contrast to
Weinberg’s paper [74] which, although invaluable in
highlighting the pros and cons of DAG models, does
not actually use DAGs, but heuristic diagrams not dis-
similar to those proposed by Ottman [56] and, over 35
years ago, Susser [75]. In the approach advocated by
VanderWeele and Robins [76], DAGs are considered
implicitly causal. We feel that this can be overly confi-
dent when the bases for inference are observational
studies, which is generally the case in human gene-
tic studies. Thus, we propose a more conservative
approach that involves assessing the causal properties
of each individual relationship.
A final caveat to interpreting DAGs involving genes as
causal is whether genetic variants can be considered
causes of diseases [30]; in a strict sense this issue is
unresolved. It is generally accepted that the causal nat-
ure of a relationship can be assured when interventions
(such as those performed in experiments) take place.
This is because controlled interventions usually (and
more easily) guarantee that the association investigated
is not confounded (but this is not an absolute rule).
VanderWeele and Robins [61,76] assume that genes can
be considered causes of diseases, without discussing the
implications or bringing additional information such as
Hill’s criteria into play; we believe that this is a strong
assumption: knowledge on the mechanisms that govern
the subclinical development and clinical course of com-
plex diseases is rather limited.
In summary, we believe that the DAG and causal cri-
teria-based approaches can complement one another, as
one helps to assess the strength of evidence, while the
other disentangles -in a visual but also formal way- the
role played by genes, environmental exposures, and
their interactions. The method we suggest can easily be
extended to more complex situations and in particular
to the understanding of gene-gene associations and
interaction. The problems we raise are likely to become
more relevant as genome-wide association studies pro-
vide new candidate genes for a variety of diseases, Men-
delian randomization is used to assess exposure-disease
associations, and gene-environment interactions are
further investigated in genetics and epigenetics.
Appendix 1 Using Austin Bradford Hill’s
guidelines in genetics and genomics
There are some general aspects to consider when tack-
ling cause-effect relationships in genetics. First, most
associations for individual genetic variants and common
chronic diseases have weak to modest effects. Empirical
findings show that even for fairly well established asso-
ciations, the effect sizes are weak to modest; i.e., relative
risks are usually under 2, and often between 1.2 and
1.6) [11]. Generally speaking, the stronger the associa-
tion between a risk factor and a disease, the more likely
it is that the association is causal, because confounding
and other biases are unlikely to explain it away. How-
ever, in genetics the penetrance of an individual genetic
variant associated with a disease depends on the interac-
tions of the variant with external exposures, the internal
environment, or other genetic variants. In spite of the
etiologic complexity of common diseases and the result-
ing weak effects of individual genetic variants, theoreti-
cal work suggests that the combination of as few as 20
common variants with weak to moderate effect sizes,
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when put together as a system of variants (or genomic
profiles), can account for a substantial attributable frac-
tion of the disease in the population [12]. On the other
hand, a large number of rare variants each contributing
(or causing) a strong disease risk may also be a plausible
explanation. The potential rarity of highly-penetrant var-
iants, the weakness of common associations, and the fre-
quency of complex gene-environment interactions pose
severe challenges to the statistical power to find mar-
ginal effects of single gene variants on risks for common
diseases. In fact, the strength of the association with the
gene (main effect) may be low while the gene-exposure
interaction is strong. This may be more convincing evi-
dence of the truly causal nature of the association, given
the available biological knowledge on environmental
influences on gene expression.
Consistency in genetic studies was traditionally poor
in the “candidate gene” era, with few associations con-
firmed in more than one study [13], but this has chan-
ged rapidly with genome-wide association studies
(GWAs). More than 600 stable replicated hits have been
reported in 2007 and 2008 from GWAs, due to an in-
built, strong process of replication of findings. One
advantage of GWAs is that they are published only if
the results are replicated in 3-4 or more independent
studies. As a result in genetic epidemiology there is now
a widely accepted requirement for “internal” consistency.
A similar approach would be invaluable in non-genetic
epidemiology but is currently not practiced. Poor repli-
cation for candidate genes is related to multiple factors,
including type 1 errors ("false positives”) and publication
bias, as well as to methodological issues as biases in the
selection of cases and controls, exposure assessment
errors, and confounding.
In addition, the expression of genes is so dependent
on the surrounding circumstances (other genes, internal
environment -e.g., immunological and nutritional status
[14]-, external physical environment, gene expression),
that the same main clinical effect of a gene variant is
difficult to capture in different studies conducted under
different conditions. In fact, such main effects may not
be identical in different studies that are conducted in
actual -sometimes, very different- human contexts; a
genuine heterogeneity of human genetic effects across
population groups -and individuals- is to be expected on
the basis of knowledge on how biological, clinical and
environmental processes jointly cause disease in
humans. An example of the influence of study design is
the investigation of gene-disease associations in founder
populations, in which the effect of a genetic variant is
likely to be higher than the average across all popula-
tions [15]. Another example is familial aggregation stu-
dies, where familial disease risks are influenced not only
by the genetic mutations or variants of interest, but also
by other genetic and epigenetic processes; if the latter
are overlooked, the penetrance of the former may be
overestimated [16-18].
To some extent it is reasonable to hope that genetic
associations are specific, thus facilitating causal infer-
ence. For example, 5-HTT variants have been associated
specifically with bipolar disorder, probably because of
the role of the gene in serotonin metabolism [19]. But
expectations of specificity may disregard biological
knowledge (e.g., on cofactors, multiple causes and
effects) that makes unspecificity more plausible. A
potential problem in the use of specificity as a criterion
for causality is that many genetic variants belong to
metabolic, inflammatory, homeostatic and other path-
ways that could influence multiple disease processes.
This is an extension of the concept of pleiotropy that
we see in single gene disorders. For example, MTHFR
variation involves folic acid and methylation pathways
that may have potential relevance to the genesis of
many disease outcomes, as birth defects, cardiovascular
disease and cancer [20]. The same is likely to be true
for DNA repair genes [21]. This issue has long been
observed in non genetic epidemiology in relation to
some common risk factors, such as socio-economic sta-
tus or cigarette smoking, which are associated with
many disease outcomes. The value of specificity
increases with increasing knowledge about the constitu-
ents of the exposure (e.g., PAHs and other carcinogens
for cigarette smoking), and of its biological or environ-
mental effects. For example, on the basis of functional
knowledge, only bladder cancer, and perhaps colon
cancer, may be expected to be associated with NAT2
variants [22-24]. Such postulated associations are biolo-
gically plausible because there is evidence that aromatic
amines or heterocyclic aromatic amines, which are
metabolised by NAT2, are involved in bladder or colon
carcinogenesis. Nevertheless, NAT2 associations are also
observed with breast and lung cancer and mesothelioma
[25,26], without evidence of biological plausibility. This
unexpected non-specificity may be true and due, for
instance, to a pleiotropic effect of the exposure; or the
apparent association with the outcome (in this case,
other than bladder cancer) may be confounded by yet
unknown factors. Similar situations are encountered in
clinical medicine and non genetic epidemiology; for
example, the early observation of an inverse association
between hormone replacement therapy (HRT) and mor-
tality due to accidents and violence, which was of the
same magnitude as that originally found for cardiovas-
cular mortality [27]. This prompted a debate on the cau-
sal nature of the association between HRT and
cardiovascular mortality, as no plausible biological rea-
son for the protective effect of HRT on violent death
could be argued.
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Temporality is also relevant to the study of the geno-
types; since gene variants are inherited and do not
change after conception, they precede the onset of dis-
ease indeed. In addition the temporal pattern with
which a particular variant/mutation manifests itself can
be relevant. In Huntington’s disease, for example, there
is the phenomenon of “anticipation” (younger age of dis-
ease onset in one generation than in the previous)
depending on the number of the repeated triplets in the
gene (which tend to increase in the offspring). For
acquired genetic alterations (e.g., somatic mutations)
temporality is also important; in persons living in nor-
mal conditions the timing of occurrence of the mutation
often cannot be observed directly. A collection of
archived specimens may help, as can knowledge on the
usual course of events gained from molecular pathology
studies. For epigenetic mechanisms temporality is even
more crucial, but it is beyond the purpose of this article
[14,16-18].
In genomics, the possibility of observing a dose-
response gradient depends on the model of genotype-
phenotype relationships. Even for a diallelic system at
one locus, there could be recessive, dominant or codo-
minant models. The biologic model for the action of
numerous alleles at different loci is more complex and
is essentially unknown for most common diseases. Only
if the genetic model is codominant can a dose-response
be observed. However, a different kind of dose-response
is observable if we consider the cumulative effect of
multiple genes or SNPs. Both the risk of lung cancer
and the levels of DNA damage can increase approxi-
mately linearly with an increasing number of “at risk”
gene variants [21,28]. Gene copy number variation can
lead to more complex dose-response relationships.
Quantitative continuous markers used in epigenetics
(promoter methylation) and transcriptomics (gene
expression) may be analyzed in search of dose-response
effects (linear or non-linear).
In genetics experimental evidence comes mainly from
animal studies in which knock-out organisms are used
in order to have a pure genetic disease model. This
directly tests the effect of the absence or presence of
specific genetic factors on the organism. Extrapolation
of the results of these experiments to humans is challen-
ging due to differences between humans and the knock-
out organisms in both the genetic make-up and the
potential types of gene-gene and gene-environment
interactions. Genetic experimental studies have also long
been known to reproduce disease phenotypes (e.g., in
mice) that are only a partial approximation of the com-
plex human disease; an example is the Super Oxide
Dismutase-1 (SOD1) mutated mouse model for Amyo-
trophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), which has different
motor characteristics than the human disease [29].
Appendix 2 The calculus of the Decision Theoretic
Framework (DTF)
The calculus of DTF
Conditional independence [12] is the tool DTF uses to
a) express how variables are associated and b) to under-
stand when it is possible to make inferences about cau-
sal associations from data that are observational. It is
best described as follows: consider 3 variables A, B and
C. Say that Pr(A,C|B) = Pr(A|B)Pr(C|B) (where Pr(.)
means probability of).
Then we can say that A is independent of C given B -
formally: A ┴┴C|B.
This means that if we know what B is, knowing what
A is gives us no further information on C; e.g., if we
want to know the genetic make up of Alfred (A), we
can gain some information by looking at his brother
Colin (C). If however, we can see their parents Barry
and Barbara (B), then knowing about Colin gives us no
further information on Alfred. This shows where the
“familial” terminology used in DAGs comes from.
Conditional independence is a non-graphical (and
non-causal) equivalent of the d-separation criteria used
in the causal DAG approach [11]. It forms the basis for
the formal treatment of DTF, and its manipulation
allows us to determine under what circumstances we
can equate the results of observation to those of experi-
ment [35,44].
The original role of DAGs in the statistical literature is
to encode statistical associations (described, for instance,
by Chi-squared tests). Thus, in DTF the lack of directed
edges in a DAG is viewed as conditional or marginal
independence between variables, not a lack of a causal
relationship. There are two problems with interpreting
DAGs encoding such associations as causal. The first
problem is that often there is more than one DAG repre-
senting the same set of conditional independences (see
example below). To determine which, if any of them, is
causal, we must use knowledge that is not inherent in
the data or the DAG (e.g., time ordering). The second
problem is that we often do not have data on all the vari-
ables that play a role (causal or otherwise) in the problem
we are considering. This means that the DAGs only tell
us about the relationships between the variables we have
observed, making a causal interpretation dangerous.
Consider the following simple example: A and B are
proteins produced in the body and C is a cancer
thought to be associated to the production of A and B.
It is possible to artificially increase the amount of B in
the system and we would eventually like to know
whether this could prevent the emergence of the cancer
C. However, at this point we do not know whether A or
B are produced by the presence of C or indeed whether
there is any natural ordering to the appearance of the
three variables. We obtain the conditional independence
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A┴┴C|B from data on a number of individuals in a case
control study investigating possible causes of C. This is
encoded by all three DAGs in the Figure 2. These three
DAGs only tell us one thing, namely that the cancer is
not directly associated to protein A (when we only con-
sider these three variables and the individuals in the
study). They do not tell us whether treating patients
with B will have a positive effect on the incidence of C
or indeed how A and B are associated. Thus, trying to
determine whether intake of B will act as a preventive
agent (i.e., whether B causes C) based only on current
knowledge and the DAGs is impossible. When we face a
problem that we do not understand fully, interpreting
one DAG or even one particular directed edge as causal
can be difficult.
Randomisation and interventions
One way of determining whether relationships depicted
in a DAG describing observational data are causal is to
relate it to an equivalent situation under intervention or
randomisation. It is generally accepted that the ideal for
causal inference is the randomised controlled trial
because confounding is eliminated or attenuated. It is
generally also accepted [36] that when we perform an
external intervention, such as randomisation on a sys-
tem in equilibrium, we can view the consequences as
causal. Thus, intervention is a formal way of asserting
cause-effect relationships.
In DTF we introduce randomisation as a variable R
(Figure 3). To clarify, consider the following example.
Assume that X is a binary variable that can be forced to
take on a particular value or “set”. It takes on two
values: “active” (X = a), or “baseline” (X = b). The ran-
domising variable R has the same settings as X as well
as the observational setting R= Ф (the empty set). When
R = a then X = a with no uncertainty (imagine forcing
X to take on this value, say by administering the treat-
ment to a compliant patient). Similarly, when R= b, X =
b with no uncertainty. Finally when R = Ф, X is allowed
to arise without intervention and can take on the values
a and b as in an observational study. For causal infer-
ence in DTF we want to estimate (usually the expected
value of) the outcome Y given that an intervention has
happened. For example, if we want to know which treat-
ment, active or baseline, is better for Y, we might look
at the difference in the expected value of Y given these
treatments: E(Y | R = a)- E(Y|R = b). This would then
be a measure of the causal effect of a vs b. In observa-
tional studies, we do not have E(Y|R = a) the interven-
tional expectation; rather, we have E(Y| X = a, R = Ф)
the observational expectation; similarly for b. The ques-
tion is, therefore, how to make an inference about the
former using the latter. One assumption that is often
made is that all observed confounders U are observed.
However, this is often not possible and other approaches
that simulate randomisation, such as the instrumental
variable approach known as Mendelian randomisation
[37] can be used. See Dawid [41], Didelez [42], and
Geneletti [43] for formal examples.
Introducing randomisation can also help us distin-
guish between intermediate variables and confounders,
as when X is randomised the association between X and
any confounders U is severed, whilst that with inter-
mediates is not (A and B in Figure 3). Statistically, if
after randomising X the distribution of U conditional on
X remains the same as before randomisation, then U is
a confounder rather than a mediating variable, as this
means that U is independent of X when it is rando-
mised. This corresponds precisely to the situation
described by the DAG in Figure 3A. If U depends on X
then we have that U is a mediator as in Figure 3B.
As also shown in Figure 3B, interventions are repre-
sented by decision nodes (square boxes) in augmented
DAGs [38], and these can be used to make some causal
inferences, as DAGs explicitly represent interventions.
By introducing the randomisation/intervention variables
explicitly into the DAG, we can use conditional inde-
pendences to determine when it is possible to estimate
the causal effect (based R = a,b) from data that are
observational (based on R = Ф and X = a,b). Again, as a
detailed description of the formal DTF is beyond the
scope of this paper, we refer the interested reader to
previous work [41-44].42 43
Appendix 3 Parkinson’s disease: environmental
and genetic risk factors
Parkinson’s disease: environmental factors
Large epidemiological studies aimed at identifying risk
factors for Parkinson’s disease have suggested a role of
1-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydropyridine (MPTP) (a
compound accidentally produced in the manufacture of
illegal drugs), of some pesticides, of certain metals and
of polychlorinated biphenyls [46]. On the other hand,
tea and coffee drinking, use of non-steroidal anti-inflam-
matory drugs, and high blood levels of uric acid have
been suggested to be protective for Parkinson’s disease
[46].
Parkinson’s disease: single gene disorders
To date, eleven monogenic forms have been identified
(with PARK1 to 11 gene acronyms); they will be selec-
tively discussed below (Table 1) [47]. However, mono-
genic forms of Parkinson’s explain no more than 20% of
the early-onset cases of the disease, and less than 3% of
the forms with onset in the old ages, a situation that is
common to many chronic diseases as breast cancer (e.g.,
role of BRCA1) or heart disease (e.g., Familial Hyperch-
olesterolemia). Most forms of the disease appear to be
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caused or at least influenced by complex interactions
between several genes, or between genes and environ-
mental factors.
The a-synuclein, encoded by the SNCA gene, is a pro-
tein with several functions in signal transduction and vesi-
cle trafficking; it is also a competitive inhibitor of an
enzyme involved in the L-Dopa biosynthesis. Three
known dominant mutations on the SNCA gene have been
identified in families affected by Parkinsonism with
dementia characterised pathologically by diffuse Lewy
bodies, mainly composed of a-synuclein. The identifica-
tion of these mutations contributes to the contention as to
whether the so-called Lewy body disorders (Parkinson’s
disease, Parkinsonism with dementia, and dementia with
Lewy bodies) represent a continuum or have to be consid-
ered as distinct diseases [47]. This is thus as well an excel-
lent example of a situation in which researchers try to
elucidate the causal relationships between a complex set
of genotypes and a rich spectrum of clinical phenotypes.
The LRRK gene encodes for a protein involved in
multiple functions; three dominant mutations are
known. Pathologically, the disease is characterised by a
typical Lewy body pattern consistent with the post mor-
tem diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease. However, some
cases with tau-positive pathology without Lewy bodies
have been observed even within the same family. The
pathway leading to one or the other condition is likely
to be influenced by genetic and/or environmental factors
that remain to be identified [47].
There are more than 50 known variants in the parkin
gene and their effect on the disease appears to be
recessive. Subjects with homozygous mutations leading
to complete loss of parkin expression are found to have
a selective loss of dopaminergic neurons in the sub-
stantia nigra and in the locus coeruleus without Lewy
bodies or neurofibrillar tangles. However, subjects with
compound heterozygous mutations (a diploid genotype
in which two copies of a gene carry different muta-
tions) may present pathologically with Lewy bodies or
neurofibrillar pathology. This behaviour can be due to
the fact that the outcome is mutation-specific: some
mutations can reduce rather than abolish the protein
activity affecting substrate specificity. Otherwise, these
two different outcomes can share the primary cause (as
for the LRRK case), which is subsequently influenced
by gene-gene and/or gene-environment interactions
[47].
For the last two recessive mutations, PINK-1 and DJ-
1 there is no pathological information available. The
protein encoded by PINK-1 gene is a mitochondrial
kinase that seems to be involved in protecting the cell
from mitochondrial dysfunction and stress-induced
apoptosis [47]. The protein encoded by DJ-1 gene also
is localised on mitochondria, but it seems to belong to
the chaperones family, induced by oxidative stress [48].
This protein has been demonstrated to be involved in
cell protection during oxidative stress. Intriguingly,
reduced DJ-1 expression in Drosophila melanogaster
results in susceptibility to oxidative stress and protea-
some inhibition, which leads to a selective sensitivity to
the environmental chemical agents paraquat and rote-
none [49].
Table 1 Main identified genes involved in Parkinsonism, with their biological, clinical and pathological main features
Gene
(locus)
Protein Function Inheritance Pathology Clinical phenotype
1SNCA
(PARK1/
4)
a-
synuclein
Signal transduction, membrane
vesicle trafficking, and cytoskeletal
dynamics
Dominant Diffuse Lewy bodies
(prominently nigral and
hippocampal neuronal loss)
Early onset progressive L-Dopa
responsive Parkinsonism, cognitive
decline, autonomic dysfunction and
dementia
LRRK2
(PARK8)
Dardarin Cytosolic kinase with several
functions (including substrate
binding, protein phosphorylation
and protein-protein interactions)
Dominant Predominantly Lewy bodies
disease (rare cases with
neurofibrillar tangels and/or
nigral neuronal loss
Parkinsonism consistent with sporadic
Parkinson’s Disease. Dystonia,
amyotrophy, gaze palsy and dementia
occasionally develop
PRKN
(PARK2)
Parkin E3 ligase (conjugating ubiquitine to
proteins to target them for
degradation by the proteasome)
Recessive (rare
“presudo-
dominant”
cases
reported)
Predominantly nigral neuronal
loss (compound heterozygotes
with Lewy bodies or tau
pathology are described)
Early onset Parkinsonism, often
presenting with dystopia, with diurnal
fluctuations. Typically responsive to very
low doses of L-Dopa
PINK1
(PARK6)
- Mitochondrial kinase Recessive Undetermined Early onset Parkinsonism, slowly
progressive and responsive to low
doses of L-Dopa
DJ-1
(PARK7)
- Oxidative stress signalling molecule
on mitochondria
Recessive Undetermined Slowly progressive early-onset
Parkinsonism occasionally with
psychiatric disturbances; rare
compound heterozygotes with
Parkinsonism and dementia or
amyotrophy are described
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Appendix 4 The gene-environment interactions
(GEI) models in formal termsº
Below is a more formal treatment of the GEI models we
consider in the main text. In addition to considering the
conditional independence statements we also look at the
observed relative risks as these can give us information
about the type of interaction we are dealing with. We
assume throughout that the interaction is synergistic
rather than antagonistic and also that the appropriate
monotonicity conditions between risks hold.
First the assumption of no dependence between geno-
type and exposure is given formally DJ - 1 ┴┴ P.
Relative risks are defined as follows:
Rpd
Rpd
denotes the risk of disease of P = p and DJ-1 = d,
relative to the risk given by P = p¯ and DJ = 1 = d¯.
Model I
In addition to the above assumption the Model I DAG
represents the following conditional independence
■ Y ┴┴ (DJ-1, P)| = 0 - this tells us that when either
the variant or the exposure are not present, the dis-
ease is not associated with the mutation or the
exposure.
In terms of relative risks this model implies that
Rpd
Rpd
> 1 and
Rpd¯
Rpd
=
Rp¯d
Rpd
= 1
Model II
In addition to the above assumptions we have:
• which says that P does not affect Y when
.
Rpd
Rpd
>
Rpd¯
Rpd
> 1 and
Rp¯d
Rpd
= 1
Model III
The formal assumptions are the complement of those in
Model II.
Model IV
Rpd
Rpd
> 1 and
Rpd¯
Rpd
> 1
There are no additional assumptions here. In this case
the only way to determine which model holds is to run
an experiment or an observational study to estimate the
effect of the interaction. In this scenario it is essential to
decide on the scale of the interaction, as this will deter-
mine whether an effect is found or not. In the case of
the fruit fly, there appeared to be an increase of risk of
neural damage on the log scale, indicating a multiplica-
tive model.
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